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BOOK REVIEWS
The People's Right to Know: Legal Access to Public Records and
Proceedings. By Harold L. Cross. New York: Columbia University Press, 1953. Pp. xxiv, 405. $5.50.
This is a timely and worthwhile book: timely because it makes its
appearance at a moment when such slogans as "public business is the
public's business" and "the people have the right to know" are very
much a part of the news; worthwhile because it is the first careful,
comprehensive survey of a field of law which has heretofore received
all too little attention by the legal profession and all too little analysis
in the courts.
The field surveyed is the law of freedom of information-or more
accurately, the right of the press to gain access to governmental records
and to proceedings wherein governmental business is transacted. This
is, of course, a large order. The legal considerations controlling a reporter's right of access to a city council debate over tax assessments
may be quite different from those dealing with his right to sit in on the
hearings of a congressional committee investigating atomic energy. The
existence or non-existence of a reporter's right of access to a governmental proceeding may well have to turn, to some extent, on the type
of proceeding and on the nature of the business transacted. The author
does not devote too much space to a consideration of the problem as it
applies to governmental proceedings where a strong case might be made
for secrecy, e.g., on grounds of security. He does dig deeply into the
law-such little law as there is-which applies to proceedings where the
case for preserving secrecy is certainly weaker. And especially comprehensive and useful in the discussion of the common law and statutory
law pertaining to the "right" to inspect official records in the files of
local or state governmental units. The author is frankly partisan (for
the newspaperman whose interest he rather indiscriminately equates to
the public's), and he hits hard at the infirmities of the existing lawproblems which center about the definition of "public records"' and the
1 See, e.g., N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 132-1, 6 (1952), the North Carolina statutes
which bear on the problem. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1 (1952) defines "public
records" as "papers . . . documents [etc.] made and received in pursuance of law
by the public offices of the State and its counties, municipalities and other subdivisions of government in the transaction of public business." N. C. GEN. STAT.
§ 132-6 (1952) gives a right to "any person" to inspect such records at "reasonable

times" and under "superyision" of the custodian of the records. Mr. Cross asks
whether such a definition of "public records" is not too limited. For a more comprehensive definition, see the Louisiana statute, LA. REv.\STAT. §44:1 (1950).
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extent of the discretion to be lodged in the courts in deciding just who
may inspect a "public record" and when he may do so.
Similarly, the author culls over decisions and statutes which do or
do not recognize a "right" of access to the proceedings of municipal and
state administrative bodies; he surveys the "right" to report legislative
proceedings, but he fails-and here, at least, North Carolinians might
raise an eyebrow-to devote much discussion to the matter of executive
sessions of legislative committees.
Turning to the matter of secrecy at the federal level: the book contains a wealth of useful information and background authority for anyone who would really choose to investigate the problem; federal statutes
and various rulings dealing with access to federal governmental records
are set forth and discussed. But some vital aspects of the problem are
not treated sufficiently, in the opinion of this reviewer. For example,
there is no real analysis of the alleged deficiencies of the Truman security
order ;2 nor is there any discussion of another problem which surely
warrants reflection: the matter of the-right to know something, something more than we do know, about the administration of the federal
loyalty program.
Assuredly it is at the federal level that the "right to know" counts
the most; and yet, it is also at that level that the need for secrecy is most
apparent. The demands of security are obviously making drastic cuts
into the flow of information. Unfortunately these restrictions seem to
be here to stay. But the legal basis and the legal limitations-if there are
any-on this relatively new and growing power of censorship demand
concern. The government has reached imponderable proportions. It
is doing today so many more things which deeply touch upon our freedoms and perhaps our lives than it did yesterday that we cannot afford to
ignore the implications of the paradox which results from having a maximum of security in a country whose boast is a maximum of freedom.
As Mr. Cross maintains the "right to know" is an adjunct to the
maintenance of our "first freedom"-the right to speak and publish.
The First Amendment rests on the assumption that speech is not a
privilege but a necessity in a scheme of government which puts such a
large measure of responsibility on the citizen-elector. The free market
of ideas is the surest way to expose error and determine truth, to find
fresh inspiration and new ideas to cope with the awesome challenges of
these times. In short, the First Amendment contemplates far more than
a tolerance of speech; it assumes an affirmative need for a continuous
flow of ideas of every sort and information about every subject, to the
2Exec. Order No. 10290, 16 FED. REG. 9795 (1951). It was criticized, revoked,
and superseded by a new order by the new administration. See Exec. Order No.
10501, 18 FED. RE. 7049 (1953). It might be worthwhile to have had an exhaustive
criticism of the Truman order, so as to judge better the merits of the 'new order.
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end that the people, acting through the agency of government, may decide what is best for their future.3
If that is so, then the law should put a premium on the yet unrecognized "right to know." It is deserving of some constitutional dignity.
Of course, slogans and labels will not solve concrete cases: it is not
enough to argue that "public business is the public's business" and demand that all doors be opened. Other considerations may sometimes
be paramount-as in the case of the reporter who would demand access
to the conferences of the Supreme Court on the segregation cases, or
access to the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to cite two obvious
and extreme examples. But, as Mr. Cross says, "The First Amendment
points the way"; secrecy, should be the exception, and always wellgrounded in some carefully defined, overriding public interest; the
"right to know," as an integral part of free speech, warrants more recognition and protection than it has received at the hands of the common
law and more than it received under many statutes and federal regulations. Mr. Cross' exhaustive and well-documented research teaches
precisely that lesson.
JAMES C. N. PAUL
Assistant Director
Institute of Government
University of North Carolina
Chapel Hill, North Carolina
Psychiatry and the Law. By M. S. Guttmacher, M.D., and Henry
Weihofen. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1952. Pp. 476. $7.50.
In keeping with the advances in civilization we have observed an
increased complexity in social institutions. The professions have moved
steadily toward each other as a result of their expansion, so that many
times it is difficult to define one in contrast with another. Two of these
professions-law and psychiatry-have discovered many overlapping
responsibilities. Both share a basic interest in the behavior of people.
Both are sought after by people in trouble. Both have a common responsibility to try to make society a better place in which to live, by
methods designed to make people more adaptable to a constantly changing culture. It is therefore natural that over the last few decades many
writings concerning the legal aspects of psychiatry and the psychiatric
aspects of law have appeared.

The book,

PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW,

is neither of these, but is

rather an attempt to present both aspects. It is a valuable contribution
to the present-day trend toward mutual cooperation between social agen'Cf. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931).
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cies and insitutions. The authors present observations made during an
obviously thorough experience in which law and psychiatry have become
involved with one another. The book should have much appeal to a
large group of highly skilled people in important professions. It may
well serve as a stimulus for significant changes in the methods and procedures of contemporary psychiatry and law. As such it would have
major social significance.
The book begins with a simplified definition of the relationship between psychiatry and law. The first half of the book is devoted to a
practical description of modem psychiatric diagnosis with many wellchosen examples of how individuals with these illnesses might behave in
society and in court. The cases chosen as examples are not too extreme
and are adapted to the purposes of the discussion. A short chapter on
Personality Formation, which introduces the psychiatric material, enhances its understanding.
The last half of the book is given over to a discussion of various ways
in which psychiatry and the law overlap. A listing of the titles of these
chapters reads as follows: The Psychiatrist on the Witness Stand, CrossExamination, Eliminating the Battle of the Experts, The Patient's Privilege of Silence, Hospitalizing the Mentally Ill, Mental Incompetency,
Veracity, Mental Disorder and the Criminal, and Mental Disorder and
the Criminal Law. Each of these chapters goes into considerable detail,
using examples freely to illustrate points. Sensible suggestions are
offered as to how problems encountered in these areas could be handled
more effectively. The closing chapter makes a well-formulated plea for
more emphasis to be placed upon the prevention of mental illness.
In reading this book one cannot help but look for even more definite
solutions to the problems which are presented, though many suggestions
are made. The simple exposition of these problems in a book such as
this should go a long way toward helping us meet these problems more
effectively.
It is the opinion of the reviewer that this book should be a "must"
for psychiatrists and lawyers; it should also be placed high on the required list for physicians, dentists, public health personnel, social workers,
psychologists, and others in public life.
ROGER Wm. HOWELL, M.D.
Professor of Mental Health
School of Public Health
University of North Carolina
Chapel Hill, North Carolina

